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Introduction 
Neoliberalism is a political philosophy and an ‘art of government’ that has become hegemonic 
within capitalist countries after the economic crisis of the mid-1970s and the consequent 
dismantling of economic and institutional relationships based on the Fordist-Keynesian mode of 
production and regulation. In the subsequent decade, the fall of the Soviet Union opened the way 
for the triumph of neoliberal capitalism in the alleged absence of viable alternatives. Neoliberal 
ideas, therefore, gained ground at a time of economic and geopolitical turmoil and change between 
the 1970s and the 1980s. The following two decades, then, have seen the expansion of the 
neoliberal project in both qualitative and quantitative terms: on the hand, it has deeply restructured 
existing economic and institutional relations in capitalist societies; on the other hand, it has 
achieved an increasingly global reach at a time of advanced globalisation.   
 Cities have played a central role in the ascendancy and the geographical extension of 
neoliberalism. The aim of this chapter is to show how cities have been crucial to the realisation of 
the neoliberal project. The chapter is divided in two main sections: the first section is dedicated to 
reconstructing the historical trajectory of neoliberalism; the second section presents the two-sided 
relationship between cities and neoliberalism, looking at both the way in which neoliberalism has 
incorporated long-term features of the urban phenomenon in capitalist societies and at the way the 
urban phenomenon has been reshaped by the advent of neoliberalism itself. 
 
The historical trajectory of neoliberalism  
The hegemony achieved by neoliberalism in contemporary societies over the last three decades 
has coincided with the triumph of the idea of ‘freedom’, understood as an aversion towards any 
limitation imposed by the state to markets and individual enterprise. This principle was already 
present in the founders of classical political economy, most famously expressed by the laissez-
faire laissez-passer motto attributed to the physiocrats contrasting market protectionism in 
Eighteenth-Century France. Between the First and the Second World War, free-market ideas 
started being revisited by scholars and intellectuals disappointed by the failures of classical 
laissez-fare liberalism, symbolised by the financial crash of 1929. The new neoliberal ideas 
demanded a substantial change in the theorisation of the relationship between state and the 
market and thus of the idea of freedom. As Foucault argued in his famous lecture on neoliberal 
governmentality at the Collège de France, while classic liberalism had called on government to 
respect and monitor market freedom, in the neoliberal approach the market started being viewed 
as the organising and regulatory principle underlying the state itself (Lemke, 2001). This means 
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that the logic of the market was bound to permeate all aspects of social life according to the 
emerging neoliberal wisdom. 
The starting point in the trajectory of neoliberalism can be identified in 1938, when a 
heterogeneous group of scholars and entrepreneurs sharing the belief in free market along with an 
hostility towards collectivism and socialism took part in the Walter Lippmann Colloquium in Paris. 
The event was dedicated to the identification of a line of action aimed at re-launching the liberal 
cause in both intellectual and political terms. Neoliberalism’s rise began at a time in which 
Keynesianism with its emphasis on state intervention and an expansionary fiscal policy became 
predominant within Western governments in response to the Great Depression, most notably in the 
United States with the New Deal embraced by President Franklin D. Roosvelt in the 1930s.  
However, due to the start of the Second World War the intellectual and political agenda resulted 
from the Lippmann Colloquium could not be implemented.  
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, a decisive contribution to the resurgence of 
the still embryonic neoliberal project came from the Mont Pelerin Society, founded in 1947 in 
Switzerland by a group of intellectuals comprising prominent economists and philosophers such as 
Friedrich von Hayek (the first president of the Society), William Röpke, Milton Friedman, Karl 
Popper, Ludwig von Moses. Both the Lippmann Colloquium and the Mont Pelerin Society played a 
decisive role in the ascent of post-war neoliberalism, bringing together scholars from different 
national and intellectual backgrounds (Audier, 2012). In the following decades, the neoliberal 
project was reinvigorated by the growing popularity of the Chicago School of Economics within and 
outside the academia. In 1962, in particular, the publication of Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and 
Freedom attracted the attention of a large readership going beyond the narrow circles of post-war 
neoliberalism. In 1976, Friedman received the Nobel Prize, gaining international acclaim as one of 
the most influential economists of the Twentieth Century. This popularity led him to become a key 
adviser to the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, while his supposed contribution to economic 
reforms in Chile during Pinochet’s military dictatorship remains more controversial.  
 The adoption of ideas derived from neoliberal thinkers within the policy sphere followed in 
the wake of neoliberalism’s becoming a ‘common sense’ system of values in Gramscian terms 
after the decline of Keynesianism. To analyse neoliberalism’s trajectory from ‘common sense’ to a 
coherent governmental rationality and practice, it is worth starting from Jamie Peck and Adam 
Tickell’s identification of two phases of neoliberalism, a characterisation which is now widely 
accepted within the general literature dealing with this topic, especially in human geography: the 
so-called roll-back and roll-out stages of neoliberalism over the 1980s and the 1990s (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002). The former is seen as the destructive moment in the ascendancy of neoliberalism 
within the globalising world. In this phase, neoliberalism dealt mainly with the economic sphere, 
imposing the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the restructuring of the labour market 
according to the flexibility imperative. The latter phase, on the other hand, exemplifies the creative 
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moment of neoliberalism touching on a larger set of societal realms such as social and penal 
policy, the sense and practice of urban citizenship, the cultural sphere, in the attempt to 
entrepreneurialise the governance of economy and society as a whole.   
The roll-back stage of neoliberalism is customarily associated with the Reagan and 
Thatcher governments in the USA and the UK during the 1980s. In explicit contrast to demand-side 
policies drawing inspiration from Keynes, the Reagan Administration established a new pattern of 
supply-side policies, commonly known as Reaganomics. While Keynesianism supported measures 
aimed at stimulating the aggregate demand with a multiplier effect on the general economic 
activity, even if this entailed relatively high rates of inflation, Reagan’s neoliberal economic policies 
looked at inflation as a serious problem threatening economic stability and social prosperity, 
caused by uncontrolled deficit spending. The ‘war on inflation’ thus became one of the major 
concerns of Reagan Administration and prominent justification for budget cutbacks hitting welfare-
state institutions such as transportation, health-care and education (McCormack, 2012). In order to 
revitalise the stagnating economy, the Reaganomics tried to stimulate economic growth acting on 
the supply side, rather than on the demand side as recommended by Keynesian economists. The 
supply-side policy consisted essentially of two lines of action: on the side of businesses and on the 
side of the workforce. The former benefitted from generous tax breaks and incentives, while the 
latter experienced a process of flexibilisation and re-orientation towards either low-skilled jobs or 
knowledge-intensive professions, leading to new phenomena of socio-spatial polarisation in 
contemporary globalising cities. Moreover, the high interest rates policy adopted by the Federal 
Reserve in the early 1980s in order to reduce the money supply and to get rid of inflation, as 
recommended by the monetarist economists, had consequences at an international level, 
aggravating the debt of developing countries, particularly in Latin America and opening the way for 
a decade of neoliberal reforms under the rubric of the so-called ‘structural adjustment programmes’ 
(Peck, 2001). 
The 1980s are, therefore, the destructive stage in the ascent of neoliberalism. The 1990s, 
on the other hand, are the decade in which neoliberalism has devised the constructive part of its 
governmental project, aimed at rebuilding the capitalist state on entrepreneurial bases and at re-
shaping in innovative ways the relationships between business interests and the public sector: the 
roll-out phase of neoliberalisation, to use the terminology proposed by Peck and Tickell. While 
conservative leaders such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s embraced the 
ideal of the purest free-market society, in the 1990s the centre-left parties governing the US, the 
UK as well as key countries in Continental Europe such as Germany and Italy sought to reconcile 
the enhancement of social cohesion with the stimulation of economic competitiveness and to turn 
the public sector into a more accountable and entrepreneurial organisation, rather than dismantling 
it in a straightforward manner.  
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Peck and Tickell’s characterisation of the neoliberal era dates back to the early 2000s, 
taking into account the two previous decades of the neoliberal ascent. Since then, two further 
stages can be observed: the first lasted until the late 2000s, being characterised by the toughening 
of police action and the adoption of exceptional security measures (such as the Patriot Act signed 
by President George W. Bush in 2001) towards ethnic minorities and the new ‘dangerous classes’; 
the second has derived from the financial crash of 2007-08 and the following global recession, 
taking the form of a déjà vu of the austerity policies experienced during the ‘destructive’ phase of 
the neoliberal age in the 1980s. We can define this phase in terms of ‘late neoliberalism’, due to 
the central role played by ‘negative’ forces such as war and economic crisis on the evolutionary 
pathway of the neoliberal regime.  
Let’s start from the first stage in the late neoliberal trajectory. In the 2000s, in reaction to the 
September 11 attacks and the subsequent wave of global terrorism, the return of conservatives to 
political power in the major Western countries, most notably the Bush Jr. administration (2001-
2008), but also those of Merkel in Germany (2005-present), Berlusconi in Italy (2001-2006 and 
2008-2011), Sarkozy in France (2007-2012) and finally of Cameron in Great Britain (2010-present), 
led to the accentuation of the penal wing of the neoliberal state. At this time, both the military 
conducting the global ‘war on terrorism’ in the Middle East and elsewhere, easily degenerating into 
brutal human rights’ violations (as disclosed by the scandals in the detention camps of 
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib), and the police repressing the popular riots in the French banlieues 
monopolised the attention of critical geographers and urbanists (Gregory, 2004; Dikeç, 2007). The 
Islamophobia generated by the association of global terrorism with Islam along with the refusal of 
an allegedly laxist approach to the integration of ethno-cultural minorities inspired by multicultural 
thinking led in 2011 British Prime Minister David Cameron to argue for a ‘muscular liberalism’. This 
idea was intended to reverse the process of recognition between the majority and the ethnic 
minorities: minorities must adapt to the moral and social values of the majority, rather than the 
other way around, as in progressive multicultural approaches (Kundnani, 2014).  
However, these debates rapidly lost international resonance for essentially two reasons: 
first, the emphasis laid by the Obama Administration on the need for a renewed dialogue between 
West and Islam; secondly, the advent of the global economic crisis and its devastating effects on 
European and North-American societies, which redirected the attention towards economic and 
social issues. In this context, despite its failures, neoliberalism has given proof of resilience not 
only in economic terms but also in broader cultural and political terms, dealing with its crisis of 
legitimacy by presenting itself as a governmental rationality ensuring fiscal discipline and economic 
stability, particularly in the European context. Ironically, the new era of austerity has taken shape 
shortly after Western national governments had resorted to the proverbial ‘socialisation of losses’, 
using public money to bail out suffering banks and credit institutions in the aftermath of the 2007-
08 financial crisis (Blyth, 2013). 
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BOX 1 
 
Geographies of the global economic crisis (1): from cities to nation-states 
A distinctive feature of the recent global economic crisis and the related tide of austerity measures 
lies in its geographical ubiquity. The crisis started in the United States but then rapidly migrated to 
Europe, hitting with particular intensity such diverse national political economies as Great Britain, 
Iceland, the Baltic Countries and, finally, the Southern European countries, historically the most 
fragile economies of the European Union. The coinage of the so-called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece, Spain) offers immediate evidence of the geographical ubiquity of the crisis, as this 
(infamous) label brings together a majority of South-European countries along with a country in the 
northern periphery of Western Europe: Ireland. However, more general empirical evidence shows 
that the effects of the crisis reverberate well beyond the confines of Southern Europe or the PIIGS 
circle. In 2013, about five years after the start of the economic crisis, the core economies of the 
Eurozone that were more persistently and seriously affected by a lack of economic growth in terms 
of GDP were those of Italy and The Netherlands, two countries that are clearly different in terms of 
socio-economic structure and sectoral specialisation. 
 The wide range of countries that have been hit by the economic crisis has led 
commentators and analysts to offer schematised understandings of the various ways in which the 
crisis has manifested itself within highly differentiated capitalist national economies and societies, 
both in structural and policy terms. Not only the wider public and mainstream analysts but also 
economists and other social scientists concerned with the study of capitalist economies from an 
explicitly heterodox viewpoint, such as critical political economists, have commonly interpreted the 
crisis from the point of view of national political economies (Streeck and Schäfer, 2013). This is at 
one and the same time surprising and unsurprising: it is no surprise as even in a context of 
globalization and the rescaling of societal governance state-centred views have kept dominating 
common understandings of capitalist economies, as the influential literature dealing with the 
varieties of contemporary capitalism shows (for a critical review see Peck and Theodore, 2007); 
even so, it is surprising, as since its inception the ‘urban roots’ of the crisis (Harvey, 2012) have 
been clear not only to scholars professionally engaged with this scale of enquiry (such as human 
geographers and other socio-spatial scholars) but also to the common wisdom, given the centrality 
of the mortgage crisis in the financial crash of 2007-2008. The following ‘sovereign debt crisis’ has 
overshadowed the urban rootedness of the global crisis, leading the nation-state to regain 
prominence in the eyes of commentators and analysts. 
 
 
BOX 2 
 
Geographies of the global economic crisis (2): Southern Europe 
In his acclaimed book on austerity, international political economist Mark Blyth has offered a clear 
schematisation of the nationally differentiated forms in which the crisis has hit the PIIGS countries, 
leading to the current ‘age of austerity’ (Blyth, 2013). His book shows how the five PIIGS countries 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) are far from representing an homogenous pattern of 
economic trajectory, from an era of expansion and allegedly irresponsible public spending to one of 
economic collapse and austerity, as the conventional (neoliberal) wisdom about the sovereign debt 
crisis maintains. Rather, these countries should be divided into three typologies: the first is 
represented by Greece, an exceptional case of problem country long affected by a perverse 
combination of low productivity growth and irresponsible expansionary policies, which led to 
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unsustainable debts and deficits; secondly, there are Ireland and Spain, whose economic 
pathways reflect more closely an ideal-type of neoliberal mode of economic development 
epitomised by the USA and the UK, founded on the following, interrelated characteristics: 
expanding financialisation, rising private debt of consumers and households and an unprecedented 
property bubble; thirdly, the ‘slow-motion growth’ countries, namely Portugal and Italy, which have 
been affected by sclerotic growth for many years already before the global crisis; their historically 
export-led manufacturing economies have been damaged by the adoption of the euro currency, 
because devaluations of the exchange rate that used to compensate long-term deficits and to 
reanimate national economies in response to economic slowdowns (as happened in 1992 in Italy) 
have no longer been possible, thus forcing governments to resort to international bond markets 
that led to increasing public indebtedness. 
Blyth’s interpretation is supported by strong evidence, with official data clearly showing 
Italy’s high government debt (around 120% of the GDP), while Spain for instance had a more 
moderate public debt at the advent of the crisis (60%) that thereafter has risen to the 97% of the 
total output as a consequence of the recession, according to the latest estimates. Even so, if we 
zoom in our perspective on a lower scale than that of the nation-state the process of variation looks 
more complex and nuanced. From this point of view, cities and the ways in which they have been 
dealing with the crisis and the subsequent wave of austerity measures offer a valuable vantage 
point to understand the complexities and intricacies of contemporary neoliberal economies. In 
urban scholarship, even those critical investigations on the urban manifestation of contemporary 
austerity that have thus not embraced a state-centred view have mostly focused on specific 
national contexts, while scholarship embracing a cross-national, comparative perspective, 
attempting to question or at least to complicate the conventional state-centred understanding of the 
global economic crisis, is more limited. The notion of variegated neoliberalisation (Brenner, Peck, 
Theodore, 2010) helps us uncover the specificities of place in a context of heightened circulation of 
urban development models and policy imperatives of both austerity and growth. 
 
 
 
Cities as laboratories for neoliberalism 
The previous section of this chapter has showed how the trajectory of neoliberalism has evolved 
since its appearance around the late 1930s. Neoliberalism started its trajectory as an elitist 
intellectual movement, it constructed its hegemony as a ‘common sense’ system of values and 
finally it has consolidated itself as an art of government coping with an increasing number of social 
issues.   
Cities are of special significance for the understanding of neoliberalism. In this section, we 
show how cities and neoliberalism are linked by a relationship of mutual learning and 
reinforcement. On the one hand, neoliberalism has learnt from the urban phenomenon and 
particularly from the way in which this has taken shape within capitalist societies; on the other 
hand, the urban phenomenon has learnt from neoliberalism and particularly from its tendency to 
commodify every aspect of social life.  For illustrative purposes, we will deconstruct two commonly 
used definitions associating cities and neoliberalism: urban neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism. 
Customarily, in the scholarly literature these two terms are used interchangeably. Here we 
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differentiate between the two terms, associating the notion of ‘urban neoliberalism’ with what we 
define the urbanisation of neoliberalism, while the notion of ‘neoliberal urbanism’ will be referred to 
the neoliberalisation of the urban experience.    
 
Urban neoliberalism, or the urbanisation of neoliberalism  
In the first instance, it can be argued that there are distinguishing and long-term features of the 
urban experience within advanced capitalist countries that have become key aspects of the 
neoliberal regime of societal governance. In general terms, while during the Keynesian ‘golden age 
of capitalism’ national policies focussed on issues of wealth redistribution and social welfare, cities 
were already committed to the imperative of growth, especially US cities, as repeatedly underlined 
by specialists of post-war urban politics in the United States (Judd and Swanstrom, 2014). 
Subsequently, the growth imperative has been incorporated into a more coherent policy, 
conceptual and ideological framework, under the banner of the entrepreneurialisation of urban 
governance analysed for the first time by David Harvey in the late 1980s (Harvey, 1989), which we 
now recognise as a distinctive trait of ‘urban neoliberalism’. More specifically, two aspects 
historically associated with social life in capitalist cities have played a crucial role within 
contemporary neoliberal societies: consumption and housing.  
 Since the rise of capitalism, the practice of consumption has characterised the functioning 
of urban societies. As unrivalled concentrations of consumers and sellers, cities and larger 
metropolitan areas have become crucial to the growth of consumption. With the advent of mass 
production in the Twentieth Century, increasingly standardised forms of consumption gained 
ground in Western societies and particularly in their cities and metropolitan regions. The Twentieth 
Century saw department stores proliferating at the expense of small shops and traditional open-air 
markets (Sennett, 1976), whose early examples were in large industrial cities such as Paris, New 
York and Chicago. The society of mass consumerism largely characterised the central stages of 
the so-called ‘golden age of capitalism’ in the three decades following the end of the Second World 
War.  
After the economic and geopolitical turbulences of the 1970s, the decline of Fordism and 
the related system of mass production paved the way for the advent of a neo-capitalist 
development pattern – commonly known as post-Fordism – based on lean production on the one 
hand (particularly represented by Toyota’s just-in-time technique) and on diversified consumption, 
on the other hand. With the globalisation of the world economy, the decline of Fordism in the 
Western economies was accompanied by the relocation of production to low-income countries in 
the Global South and the emergence of newly industrialised economies, particularly in the rampant 
East Asia. In the West, the predominance of the manufacturing sector was replaced by the growing 
importance of the service-oriented economy, formed essentially by two sectors: the producer 
service firms (law, accountancy, banks, etc.) and the consumption-oriented activities (retail trade, 
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restaurants, leisure venues). In this context, there was a shift of Western cities being organised as 
spaces of production in the Fordist and Keynesian era to cities as spaces of consumption under 
the post-Keyenesian and post-Fordist era. Since the late 1980s, cities started also to attract a 
massive influx of international and domestic tourists, even some cities that previously did not 
attract tourists, such as Bilbao in Spain, thanks to the new Guggenheim museum of contemporary 
art.  
The adoption of a neoliberal rationality of economic and societal governance has created, 
therefore, conditions for the triumph of consumerism as a mode of being and living reflecting 
increasingly pervasive individualisation processes. In this context, the wider financialisation of 
capitalist societies and of consumption itself through the diffusion of credit cards and other forms of 
consumer credit has given a decisive contribution to the penetration of the culture of neoliberalism 
into individual consciousness and behaviours. While in the Fordist era and the so-called golden 
age of urban-industrial capitalism, mass consumerism was oriented towards the acquisition of 
durable goods, such as the family car, home appliances and furnishings, the post-Fordist and 
neoliberal era witness increasingly individualised and diversified forms of consumption. 
Neoliberalism has given a twofold contribution to the intensification of individualised consumerism: 
first, it has allowed globalisation to function as an hegemonic force within the world economy, 
opening markets and economies to foreign direct investment and the import of external 
commodities from abroad even in previously state-planned economies such as China and India; 
secondly, it has triggered processes of commodification involving an increasing number of societal 
domains, which were under public control at the time of welfare capitalism, such as health-care, 
transportation, education and professional training (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000). Under the 
neoliberal regime, commodification and the related phenomenon of consumerism have affected, 
therefore, not only conventional consumption goods but also public services and increasingly any 
aspect of our everyday life: put it simply, we are now customers not only of shops and department 
stores, but also of hospitals, schools as well as of online social networks that have radically 
transformed our everyday life. Large cities and metropolitan areas have been key sites of this 
multifaceted societal commodification. 
Housing in capitalist cities is another societal realm in which commodification precedes the 
advent of neoliberalism, giving rise to a process of mutual reinforcement, by which neoliberalism 
has seconded and deepened a phenomenon that is intimately associated with capitalist societies. 
Historically, the housing sector has functioned as a contra-cyclical regulator of economic growth, 
as testified by the fact that Western economies, such as the US economy above all, have become 
dependent on high and constantly increasing house prices, particularly in central locations for 
business and political reasons. Moreover, the segmentation of the housing market is instrumental 
to the reproduction of capitalism’s social divisions. After the Second World War, at the peak of the 
Keynesian age, the politics of social welfare mitigated the commodification of housing through the 
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provision of public and subsidised housing, particularly in the working-class areas of industrial 
cities and towns. However, the advent of neoliberalism has revived capitalism’s longstanding 
attitude towards the commodification of housing. With the precipitous reduction in the supply of 
public housing and the end or relaxation of rent regulation in many Western countries, access to 
housing has increasingly taken the form of homeownership granted by bank loans implicating 
growing household indebtedness. The expansion of mortgage markets and the consequent 
financialisation of housing have then become distinguishing features of ascendant neoliberal 
capitalism and its crisis in the late 2000s.  
Also social discrimination is a longstanding phenomenon in the housing market, which 
neoliberal regimes have normalised within a market logic. In the United States, African-Americans 
have long been discriminated in their access to the housing credit sector as banks denied them 
mortgages, particularly in so-called ‘red-lined’, undeserving neighbourhoods (Aalbers, 2015). Even 
so, the Federal Housing Administration created in 1934 by the US Congress never seriously 
attempted to put an end to this state of affairs through an explicit anti-discrimination policy. The 
subsequent ‘subprime’ mortgages adopted since the 1990s, whose collapse has been behind the 
financial crash of 2007-08, have formalised this system of government-sponsored segregation, as 
these lending schemes have been prevalent in neighbourhoods with high concentrations of low-
income racial minorities.  
 
 
Neoliberal urbanism, or the neoliberalisation of the urban experience 
The previous section of this chapter has shown how long-term distinctive features of capitalist 
cities, such as the imperative of growth, the relentless expansion of consumption and the 
commodification of the housing sector have become key aspects of the neoliberal era, acquiring 
renewed significance as engines of capitalist restructuring and development in post-Fordist times. 
In this section, to illustrate the notion of neoliberal urbanism we will take a look into the reverse 
process: namely, how neoliberalism has subsumed within its rationality societal phenomena that 
previously existed partially or fully outside the capitalist circuit of valorisation in contemporary 
cities: creativity and culture are instructive examples in this respect. 
 Creativity has a historically ambivalent relationship with capitalism, oscillating between 
incorporation on the one hand (from conventional technological innovation processes to today’s 
post-Fordist knowledge-intensive industries) and autonomy or even opposition (creativity as a 
transgression and practice of contestation) on the other hand. Neoliberal urban regimes have 
attempted to neutralise this ambivalence, mobilising powerful mechanisms of seduction and 
cooptation of alternative subjectivities, for instance through the institutionalisation of autonomous 
creative spaces and the spectacularisation of social and cultural diversity. Critical urban 
scholarship has showed how even an intrinsically radically phenomenon such as the squatter 
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movement in European cities has not been immune to processes of normalisation and 
incorporation into the capitalist logic of what French situationist Guy Debord famously defined ‘the 
society of the spectacle’ already in the late 1960s.  
Creativity’s process of appropriation into capitalism’s cultural circuit has particularly 
intensified over the last two decades within the context of advanced liberal societies. An important 
contribution to this process has come from the publication of The Rise of the Creative Class in 
2002, a best-selling book authored by Richard Florida, an economic geographer and urban planner 
at that time based in the deindustrialising city of Pittsburgh, in the middle of the US ‘Rust Belt’ 
(Florida, 2002). In this book, Florida has provided not only a new socio-cultural explanation but 
also a powerful narrative for what had been already identified by economic development scholars 
as the key role of technology and human capital as drivers of regional economic growth. In brief, 
Florida argues that the members of the creative class – notably, workers and professionals who 
make use of creativity in their jobs: from architects and engineers to software developers, 
designers and other emerging figures in the information society – tend to favour urban 
environments characterised by the tolerance of socio-cultural diversity related to the presence of 
ethnic and sexual minorities as well as artistic communities. Moreover, according to Florida, 
creative class members share values and attitudes based on ideas of meritocracy and individuality 
along with the willingness to be part of collaborative working environments. 
While left-leaning commentators have warned against the risks associated with the 
uncritical adoption of Florida’s theory and the related public discourse, such as the legitimisation of 
gentrification dynamics in urban settings attracting creative class members, since its publication 
Richard Florida’s book has been enthusiastically welcomed by local politicians and other politico-
economic elites first in the USA, from which its empirical evidence was derived, and subsequently 
in a rapidly increasing number of ‘wannabe’ creative cities across the world. As a governmental 
technology enabling the cross-national mobility of urban development patterns, neoliberalism has 
allowed creativity to become a global policy narrative mobilised by policymakers and administrators 
in order to create consensus around newly proposed or already existing urban regeneration 
initiatives across the globe. Moreover, the individualistic and meritocratic ethics underlined by 
Richard Florida is behind the widespread careerism among creative-class members, which 
weakens their social ties undermining a sense of togetherness and the willingness to engage in 
spontaneous forms of cooperation. In 2013, San Francisco – a city witnessing skyrocketing house 
prices in recent years – has seen poorer members of the creative class protesting against the 
unsustainable costs of living caused by the presence of the affluent creative professionals 
employed in the Silicon Valley and residing in San Francisco. In recent studies, Richard Florida 
and his fellow researchers recognise the fact that in economically dynamic cities such as 
Washington, Boston, New York, the creative class’s colonisation of downtown districts forces 
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service and working-class residents to move outside the central city in the least desirable parts of 
town, leading to novel forms of socio-spatial segregation and inequality (Florida et al., 2014). 
While the urbanisation of creativity is likely to become an increasingly contested issue in 
contemporary capitalist cities, the mobilisation of culture for urban regeneration purposes still 
exerts a powerful influence on social consciousness, as cultural festivals and events are portrayed 
as opportunities for enjoying the vibrancy of city life for both residents and external visitors. With 
the entrepreneurialisation of urban governance in the 1980s, culture has been incorporated into a 
logic and circuit of valorisation as at that time cities started using their heritage and cultural 
endowments to attract public and private investments in a global context marked by heightened 
interurban competition (Rossi and Vanolo, 2012). Competition over titles attributed to cities as a 
whole such as the European Capital of Culture or to especially valuable portions of their built 
environment (historical centres, monuments, etc.) such as the UNESCO’s world heritage 
nomination have led – according to critics – to an intensified economic colonisation of the cultural 
realm. Italian writer Marco D’Eramo has recently written about what he calls the ‘UNESCOcide’ of 
contemporary cities: 
It is devastating to witness the death throes of so many cities. Splendid, opulent, hectic, for 
centuries, sometimes millennia, they had survived the vicissitudes of history: war, pestilence, 
earthquakes. But now, one after another, they are withering, emptying, becoming reduced to 
theatrical backdrops against which a bloodless pantomime is staged [...]. UNESCO’s ‘World 
Heritage’ listing is the kiss of death. Once the label is affixed, the city’s life is snuffed out; it is ready 
for taxidermy (D’Eramo, 2014: 47). 
D’Eramo’s association of the notion of urbicide with the tourist exploitation of contemporary cities 
may sound exaggerated to many readers. However, it conveys the pervasiveness of the 
culturalisation of the urban environment, which is another way in which neoliberalism pursues its 
project not only of making everything profitable in economic terms, but also of annihilating the 
publicness of contemporary cities through a myriad of processes of enclosure brought about by the 
commodification of urban spaces.  
 
Conclusion 
After having outlined the trajectory of neoliberalism over the post-war decades, this chapter has 
looked at the two-sided relationship of neoliberalism with the urban phenomenon. In particular, it 
has been argued that there is a process of mutual reinforcement between cities and neoliberalism. 
This means that neoliberalism has subsumed within its logics and functioning long-term features of 
social life within capitalist cities, such as the commodification of housing and the relentless 
expansion of consumption. The Keynesian social compact during the so-called golden age of 
capitalism temporarily mitigated these processes of commodification, which neoliberalism has 
subsequently brought to new life. At the same time, neoliberalism is not only drawing from pre-
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existing characteristic features of capitalist urbanisation, but has also expanded the economic base 
of contemporary cities, by commodifying societal phenomena that previously existed partially or 
fully outside the capitalist logics of valorisation, such as culture and creativity. 
This ambivalent relationship of mutual reinforcement explains the key contribution of critical 
urban studies to the understanding of contemporary neoliberalism. It is likely that ongoing 
processes of so-called ‘planetary urbanisation’ (Brenner and Schmid, 2014), with the geographical 
extension of urbanisation processes and related neoliberalisation dynamics spreading across the 
globalised world, will not only intensify the intimate relationship between cities and neoliberalism 
but will also bring to light novel aspects and dimensions in which this relationship takes shape.   
Moreover, the ambivalence is not limited to the described relationship between cities and 
neoliberalism. Indeed, cities are sources of crisis and austerity but also of promised resurgence for 
contemporary capitalism, as the latest global economic crisis has demonstrated; a crisis with clear 
urban roots, owing to the unprecedented financialisation of housing markets that has particularly 
affected indebted households living in large cities and metropolitan areas. On the one hand, during 
the crisis, cities have been key sites for the implementation of austerity measures adopted in 
compliance with the fiscal consolidation targets imposed by international financial institutions and 
national governments to municipalities and regional administrations. On the other hand, cities are 
persistently seen as key spaces of resurgence for capitalist economies, as urban environments 
concentrate the innovative forces of contemporary societies (Rossi, 2015). The current or future, 
depending on geographical contexts, phase of post-recession transition will show us whether 
neoliberalism will still take the lead in the governance and regulation of the constitutively dialectical 
development of contemporary capitalist cities. 
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